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# MANRS

## Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security



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# The Problem

A Routing Security Primer



# Routing Basics

~60,000 networks (Autonomous Systems) across the Internet

Routers use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to exchange “reachability information” - networks they know how to reach

Routers build a “routing table” and pick the best route when sending a packet, typically based on the shortest path

Routers use unique Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to identify themselves to all other routers

# The Problem

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is based entirely on trust

- No built-in validation of the legitimacy of updates
- The chain of trust spans continents
- Lack of reliable resource data



# Which leads to ...

**c|net** Search CNET [Q] Reviews News Video How To

CNET > Tech Culture > How Pakistan knocked YouTube offline (a) *Posted by Andree Toonk - November 6, 2015 - Hijack - 1 Comment*

## How Pakistan knocked YouTube offline (and how it happens again)

MARCH 12, 2015 COMMENTS (35) VIEWS: 37374 ENGINEERING, INTERNET, LATENCY, PERFORMANCE, SECURITY DOUG MADORY

### Routing Leak briefly takes down Google

MARCH 13, 2015 COMMENTS (34) VIEWS: 47297 SECURITY DOUG MADORY

### Massive route leak causes Internet slowdown

POSTED BY ANDREE TOONK - JUNE 12, 2015 - BGP INSTABILITY - No Comments

## DDoS Attacks Storm Linode Servers Worldwide

BY DOUGLAS BONDERUD • JANUARY 5, 2016

### UK traffic diverted through Ukraine

OCTOBER 14, 2015 COMMENTS (2)

## Global Impacts of Recent Leaks

Event type	Country	ASN
BGP Leak		Origin AS: PO box T511 Leaker AS: Viettel Corp
BGP Leak		Origin AS: Lirex net E Leaker AS: Traffic Br

CSO

Home > Data Protection > Cyber Attacks/Espionage

## DDoS attack on BBC may have been biggest in history

Most read:

### On-going BGP Hijack Targets Palestinian ISP

2016-01-13

## The Vast World of Fraudulent Routing

JANUARY COMMENTS (17) VIEWS: 36909 SECURITY DOUG MADORY


BGP hijack incident by Syrian telecommunications *Posted by Andree Toonk - December 9, 2014 - Hijack - 2 Comments*

UN-CATEGORIZED DOUG MADORY

2016-01-13

UN-CATEGORIZED DOUG MADORY

# No Day Without an Incident



<http://6bgpstream.com/>



# What's Happening?

## IP prefix hijack

- AS announces prefix it doesn't originate and wins the 'best route' selection
  - AS announces more specific prefix than what may be announced by originating AS
  - AS announces it can route traffic through shorter route, whether it exists or not
- Packets end up being forwarded to wrong part of Internet
- Denial-of-Service (DoS), traffic interception, or impersonating network or service


## Route leaks

- Violation of valley-free routing (e.g. re-announcing transit provider routes to another provider)
- Usually due to misconfigurations, but can be used for traffic inspection and reconnaissance
- Can be equally devastating

## IP address spoofing

- Creation of IP packets with false source address
- The root cause of reflection DDoS attacks

# Three months in Brazil




# Are There Solutions?

## Tools - Yes!

- Prefix and AS-PATH filtering, RPKI, IRR, ...
- BGPSEC under development at the IETF
- Whois, Routing Registries and Peering databases

## But...

- Lack of deployment
- Lack of reliable data



# A Tragedy of the Commons

From a routing perspective, securing your own network does not necessarily make it more secure. Network security is in someone else's hands.

- The more hands – the better the security

Is there a clear, visible, and industry-supported line between good and bad?

- A cultural norm?



# MANRS

A vital part of the security solution



MANRS was founded with the ambitious goal of improving the security and reliability of the global Internet routing system, based on collaboration among participants and shared responsibility for Internet infrastructure.



# Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security

MANRS defines four concrete actions that network operators should implement

- Technology-neutral baseline for global adoption
- *A minimum* set of requirements

MANRS builds a visible community of security-minded operators

- Promotes culture of collaborative responsibility



MANRS

# MANRS Actions

**Filtering** – Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information

- *Ensure the correctness of your own announcements and announcements from your customers to adjacent networks with prefix and AS-path granularity*

**Anti-spoofing** – Prevent traffic with spoofed source IP addresses

- *Enable source address validation for at least single-homed stub customer networks, their own end-users, and infrastructure*

**Coordination** – Facilitate global operational communication and coordination between network operators

- *Maintain globally accessible up-to-date contact information*

**Global Validation** – Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale

- *Publish your data, so others can validate*



## A Note on MANRS' Limitations

MANRS is an *absolute minimum* an operator should consider, with *low risk* and *cost-effective* Actions

The more operators implement MANRS, the fewer routing incidents we will see, and the smaller will be their scope

MANRS is not a one-stop solution to all of the internet's routing woes, but it is an important step toward a globally robust and secure routing infrastructure



# Why join?



# So, what is the business case for MANRS? (and routing security)

Engaged 451 Research to better understand the attitudes and perceptions of Internet service providers and the broader enterprise community around the project

# Comprehensive Research Study

## Questionnaire-based study

- Assessment against existing 451 Research data
- Common perception elements


## Service providers

- Initial targeting interviews
  - Global demographic
- 25 telephone interviews

## Enterprise Internet teams

- 250 web questionnaires
- 1,000 employee minimum
- Primarily North America

**Enterprise Demographics**



# What We Learned from the Study

## **Security is Vital to Enterprises**

- MANRS knowledge is low, but the desire for security is high
- Enterprises are willing to require MANRS compliance of their service providers

## **MANRS Adds Value for Service Providers**


- Security can help service providers differentiate from their competitors; Identifiable value in a vague market
- Service providers may be able to add additional revenue streams based on information security feeds and other add-on services



# Enterprise Security Concerns

- Widely varying concerns across a range of issues, with traffic hijacking leading the list
- Security focus is aligned with types of issues MANRS is looking to address
- Confidence that MANRS can help long-term routing security


## Internet Security Concerns



# Enterprises are Willing to Pay for MANRS

Significant value on security posture


- Median premium of 15%
- 13% would only choose MANRS-compliant providers



*Q: Would you pay a premium for MANRS compliant services?*

# Service Provider Motivations are Misaligned with Enterprise Perceptions

## Reasons for Implementation



- Most providers would implement MANRS to be more secure or for regulatory compliance
- Some would implement to be a 'good citizen' or to increase efficiency
- *No one mentioned customer demand as a reason*

*Q: Which aspect of MANRS would provide the greatest reason for implementing for your organization?*

# Why ENTERPRISES Should Require MANRS

- To improve your organizational security posture
  - Facilitate risk management for the supply chain.
  - Require MANRS compliance in RFPs, tender, and purchasing processes
  - Can be an additional factor for auditors to consider in assessments (e.g. ISO 27001:2013)
- MANRS addresses the problems that enterprises care about
  - Traffic hijacking and detour
  - Malicious traffic
  - Prompt resolution of routing security incidents
- MANRS provides a foundation for security value-added services
  - E.g. Incident Information sharing/information feeds

# Why SERVICE PROVIDERS Should Join MANRS

- To add competitive value and differentiate in a "flat", price driven market
  - Growing demand from enterprise customers for managed security services (info feeds)
  - To signal security proficiency and commitment to your customers
- To "lock-in" - from a connectivity provider to a security partner
  - Information feeds and other add-on services may increase revenue and reduce customer churn
  - Enterprises indicate willingness to pay more for secure services
- To help solve global network problems
  - Lead by example and improve routing security for everyone
  - Being part of the MANRS community can strengthen enterprise<sup>24</sup> security credentials



# Why to join MANRS?

- Improve your security posture and reduce number and impact of routing incidents
- Join the community of security minded operators  
Can you stand up publicly and say:
  - ✓ I care about routing security
  - ✓ I am prepared to spend resources on it
  - ✓ I am prepared to be held accountable by the community
- Use MANRS as a competitive differentiator


# Join Us

**Visit <https://www.manrs.org>**

- Fill out the sign up form with as much detail as possible.
- We may ask questions and run tests

## **Get Involved in the Community**

- Members support the initiative and implement the actions in their own networks
- Members maintain and improve the document and promote MANRS objectives



# MANRS Implementation Guide

If you're not ready to join yet, implementation guidance is available to help you.

- Based on Best Current Operational Practices deployed by network operators around the world
- <http://www.manrs.org/bcop/>

Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) Implementation Guide



Version 1.0, BCOP series  
Publication Date: 25 January 2017

1. What is a BCOP?
2. Summary
3. MANRS
4. Implementation guidelines for the MANRS Actions
  - 4.1. Coordination - Facilitating global operational communication and coordination between network operators
    - 4.1.1. Maintaining Contact Information in Regional Internet Registries (RIRs): AFRINIC, APNIC, RIPE
      - 4.1.1.1. MNTNER objects
        - 4.1.1.1.1. Creating a new maintainer in the AFRINIC IRR
        - 4.1.1.1.2. Creating a new maintainer in the APNIC IRR
        - 4.1.1.1.3. Creating a new maintainer in the RIPE IRR
      - 4.1.1.2. ROLE objects
      - 4.1.1.3. INETNUM and INET6NUM objects
      - 4.1.1.4. AUT-NUM objects
    - 4.1.2. Maintaining Contact Information in Regional Internet Registries (RIRs): LACNIC
    - 4.1.3. Maintaining Contact Information in Regional Internet Registries (RIRs): ARIN
      - 4.1.3.1. Point of Contact (POC) Object Example:
      - 4.1.3.2. OrgNOCHandle in Network Object Example:
    - 4.1.4. Maintaining Contact Information in Internet Routing Registries
    - 4.1.5. Maintaining Contact Information in PeeringDB
    - 4.1.6. Company Website
  - 4.2. Global Validation - Facilitating validation of routing information on a global scale
    - 4.2.1. Valid Origin documentation
      - 4.2.1.1. Providing information through the IRR system
        - 4.2.1.1.1. Registering expected announcements in the IRR
      - 4.2.1.2. Providing information through the RPKI system
        - 4.2.1.2.1. RIR Hosted Resource Certification service

# What's Next: MANRS Training and Certification

Routing security is hard. How can we make it more accessible? The “simple” MANRS Implementation Guide is a 50-page document that assumes a certain level of expertise.

## Online training modules

- Based on the MANRS Implementation Guide
- Walks a student through the tutorial with a test at the end
- Working with and looking for partners that are interested in integrating it in their curricula

## A hands-on lab to achieve MANRS certification

- Completing the online modules as a first step in MANRS certification
- Looking for partners



# What's Next: MANRS IXP Partnership Programme

There is synergy between MANRS and IXPs

- IXPs form a community with a common operational objective
- MANRS is a reference point with a global presence – useful for building a “safe neighborhood”

How can IXPs contribute?

- Technical measures: Route Server with validation, alerting on unwanted traffic, providing debugging and monitoring tools
- Social measures: MANRS ambassador role, local audit as part of the on-boarding process
- A development team is working on a set of useful actions



LEARN MORE:

<https://www.manrs.org>



# Routing security & MANRS: a poll



Vote link:

<http://etc.ch/X86z>

# Thank you.

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Job title

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